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Introduction
On September 23, 1997, the United States and Japan unveiled the new
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.1 The Guidelines, which
define the scope of the two countries' security arrangement, represent a
startling change in the existing relationship by calling for Japan to adopt a
greater military role. In the future, Japan will provide mine sweepers, help
enforce U.N. embargos, and assist in communications and surveillance. 2
More importantly, the Guidelines will allow Japan to support U.S. troops
involved in conflicts in "areas surrounding Japan.' 3 Thus, Japan may
assist in military conflicts for the first time since World War II.
Initial responses to the new Guidelines have been mixed. In the
United States, some commentators believe the new arrangement strikes the
proper balance between U.S. and Japanese commitments, 4 while others
believe that Japan does not contribute enough on behalf of its own
defense. 5 Internationally, the new Guidelines have also met with mixed
reactions. While Taiwan has praised the Guidelines as a stabilizing force in
1. The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, Sept. 23, 1997, 36 1.L.M.
1621, 1624 (1997) [hereinafter Guidelines]. The new Guidelines are actually a review of
similar Guidelines implemented in 1978 by the Security Consultative Committee, a joint
U.S.-Japan organization. The goal of the original document was to create a comprehen-
sive framework for defense cooperation and increase the credibility of the security
arrangement. The end of the Cold War and the changing security balance in the Asia
Pacific region precipitated a review of that arrangement. President Clinton and Prime
Minister Hashimoto initiated the review in 1996. The Guidelines are intended to
address these changing security concerns and redefine the balance of responsibilities
between the two states. See Japan-United States: Joint Statement on Review of Defense
Cooperation Guidelines, Sept. 23, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1621, 1623 (1997) [hereinafter Joint
Statement of the SCC]; Japan-United States: Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for
the 21st Century, April 17, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1001, 1003 (1997) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
2. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1624. For an outline of the changes from the
1978 Guidelines, see Kevin Sullivan & John M. Gosh, U.S., Japan Expand Pact on Secur-
ity, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at Al.
3. Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1630-31.
4. See generally Robert Karniol, Japan Promotes Regional Security With US Accord,
JANE's DEF. WKL.Y., Oct. 1, 1997, at 15 (viewing a Japanese role in operations such as
humanitarian aid and refugee evacuations as a stabilizing force in the region); Caspar
W. Weinberger, Commentary: Expanding the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, FORBES, Nov. 3,
1997, at 37 (arguing that the Guidelines successfully create an expanded security role
for Japan without jeopardizing the renunciation of war clause of its Constitution).
5. See Ted Galen Carpenter, U.S.-Japan Defense Accord Preserves Old Inequities,
BAIT. SUN, Oct. 23, 1997, at 17A (commenting that "[t]here is something grotesquely
unfair about expecting U.S. military personnel to risk their lives to repel an act of aggres-
sion that threatens the security of East Asia while Japan merely provides such things as
fuel, spare parts, medical supplies, and body bags for American casualties.").
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the region,6 other Asian states have been far less receptive to the new
accord.7 At the heart of this debate is to what degree Japan should provide
for its own defense and contribute to regional security given its military
aggression during World War II.
As Japan begins the difficult process of debating the implementation
legislation,8 the question should not be whether the Guidelines should be
enacted, but whether they are legal. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
(Nihonkoku Kenpd) severely limits Japanese defense policy. It states:
[a]spiring sincerely an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
6. See Lee Teng-hui Praises New Japan-U.S. Defense Accord, YOMLURI SHIMBUN, Oct.
19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12802862. Taiwan's support is hardly surprising con-
sidering that it stands to gain from the new framework. A potential crisis with mainland
China over Taiwan's survival could now result in intervention by both Japan and the
United States. See Karniol, supra note 4, at 15.
7. See North Korea Raps New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, AGEcE FRANCE-PRESsE,
Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13405373. Rodung Sinmun, the newspaper of North
Korea's ruling party, has characterized the guidelines as "the strategic plan and target of
the U.S. andJapanese reactionaries to invade and dominate Asia. The first target of their
attack is the DPRK [North Korea]." Id. The People's Republic of China has expressed
concern that the agreement could "touch off instability," because it is unclear how the
new guidelines affect the status of Taiwan. See Joseph Coleman, China, N. Korea Reac-
tion Show Why U.S.-Japan Deal Boosts Ties, Irks China, N. Korea, DAYTON DAILY Nws,
Oct. 26, 1997, at 8A. Even South Korea, a country that could benefit from the new
security relationship, has already said that Japanese troops would not be allowed on
South Korean territory in response to a regional conflict and that it expected to be con-
sulted before any military activity under the new Guidelines. See S. Korea Rejects Japa-
nese Military Operation on Its Territory, XINHUA ENG. NEwswim, Oct. 22, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 5978840. If other Asian countries adopt South Korea's cautious approach,
Japan's role in a regional security operation could be severely curtailed. Arguably, these
reactions illustrate the difficulty of trying to create a regional security framework bilater-
ally. Excluded countries perceive the Guidelines not as a regional security arrangement
but as a military alliance targeted against them. See Weinberger, supra note 4, at 37, for
the view that the arrangement is and should be an alliance against threats posed by
China.
8. See Gov't to Set Up Defense Guidelines Consulting Mechanism, JAPAN PoL'Y & PoL.,
Oct. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8244029. Japan created an intergovernmental con-
sultation mechanism to draft the new legislation. This panel consisted of chiefs from
various ministries and agencies in order to increase the effectiveness of the new Guide-
lines. See id. In April of 1998, the Hashimoto Cabinet passed three implementation bills
drafted by the consultation panel that have been submitted to the Diet. See Japan Adopts
Japan-US Defense Guidelines Bills, AGENCE FRANCE-PR.sSE, Apr. 28, 1998, available in
1998 WL 2270089. The election of Prime Minister Obuchi and the creation of a new
Cabinet stalled discussion in the Diet on the proposed implementing legislation until
February 1999. As of this writing, while some aspects of the Guidelines are already
operational, those that involve the future role of Japanese forces require implementing
legislation. See Eduardo Lachica, US Reaffirms Peace Strategy in East Asia, AsiaN WALL
ST.J., Nov. 24, 1998, at 2; DoD News Briefing, M2 PRasswmE, Nov. 24, 1998, available in
1998 WL 16534846. However, the Japanese Defense Agency is already considering
what actions it could take under the Guidelines in response to some future emergency
over the status of Taiwan. See Defense Panel Eyes Possible Dilemmas, MxNIcHI DAILY
NE Vs, Feb. 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7538474.
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right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.9
As in the United States, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and
a contrary law has no legal force. 10 By allowing Japan to participate in
regional conflicts, the Guidelines are potentially unconstitutional. How-
ever, the judiciary tends to defer to the executive and legislative branches in
defining the scope of Article 9. The government, in turn, tends to redefine
Article 9 as it sees fit. These trends imply that passage of the implementing
legislation of the Guidelines will further undermine the purposes of Article
9 by allowing the Self-Defense Force(s) (SDF) to engage in conduct beyond
mere territorial self-defense. This suggests that the model of a constitu-
tionally mandated pacifism is unworkable in the face of real political and
security concerns. Since Japan is unable to abandon Article 9, the only
practical and constitutional solution for the Diet is to reject the Guidelines,
at least in part, as unconstitutional.
Part I of this Note explores the development of the two key legal
frameworks that underlie the problem - Article 9 of the Constitution and
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It considers both the purposes of each and
the political circumstances existing at the time of their drafting. Part II
outlines the major provisions of the Guidelines and their constitutionality
in light of Article 9 as originally intended. Part III examines the differing
interpretations, based on the concept of constitutional transformation,"
that the judiciary, executive branch, and legislature have given to Article 9.
Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of the Guidelines in light of this
framework. Part V assesses the practical and legal implications of adopting
the Guidelines regardless of the constitutional scheme and explores possi-
ble alternatives to this dilemma. This Note concludes that in order to pre-
serve some semblance of pacifism, Japan should reject the Guidelines.
I. Background
A. The Inception of Article 9
Japanese pacifism, as embodied in Article 9, was the product of negotia-
tions between the U.S. occupation forces and the Japanese government at
the end of World War 11.12 General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers, had two goals for Japan before the Occupa-
tion could end. First, he wanted to eliminate any chance of future Japanese
9. KENPO [Constitution], art. 9 (Japan). Scholar ChalmersJohnson argues that the
phrase "war potential" is a mistranslation of the word senryoku which actually means
fighting power or strength. See Chalmers Johnson, Omobe (Explicit) and Urn (Implicit):
Translating Japanese Political Terms, 60 J. JAPANESE SrUD. 89, 114 (1980).
10. See KENPO, art. 98.
11. See Tomosuke Kasuya, Constitutional Transformation and the Ninth Article of the
Japanese Constitution, 3 GENDAi HorsuGAlu 41 (S. Tanaka ed., Paul Stephen Taylor
trans., 2d ed. 1984), reprinted in 18 LAw IN JAPAN 1, 1 (1986). The core idea of transfor-
mation or kempo hensen is that constitutional change is brought about by reinterpreta-
tion while keeping the formal language intact. This theory allows for a constitutional
provision to take on a meaning outside of its original scope without being considered
unconstitutional. See id.
12. See W.G. BEASLEY, THE RISE OF MODERN JAPAN 214 (1990).
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militarism through disarmament and demilitarization. 13 Second, he
wanted to establish a democratic system of government to extinguish the
feudalistic aspects of Japanese society that the United States perceived as
being responsible for Japanese militarism. 14 Although other practical
measures were taken to further both goals,' 5 a new constitution was neces-
sary to legally impose a pacifist and democratic new order. Frustrated
with the Japanese attempts at drafting the new constitution, MacArthur
ordered his staff to help the Japanese in drafting a document that after
some modification became the Constitution of Japan.16
1. Early Interpretations of Article 9
Article 9 went through several revisions prior to the Constitution's adop-
tion. Originally, MacArthur submitted three principles to Prime Minister
Shidehara that he considered fundamental to the future constitution. 17
The second principle, the precursor to Article 9, stated:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces [war]
as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own
security .... No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized
and no rights of belligerence will ever be conferred on any Japanese force. 18
Later drafts deleted the phrase "even for preserving its own security," sug-
gesting that self-defense was constitutionally permissible.19 However,
13. See id. The hope was that by eliminating the war potential of Japan and destroy-
ing ultranationalist elements within the Japanese elite, Japan could become a peaceful
member of the world community. See id. For the complete text of the U.S. policy direc-
tive, see EDWIN M. MARTIN, THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 122-50 (1948).
14. See BEASLEY, supra note 12, at 219.
15. In response to the military threat, two million men had to be demobilized and
over three million had to be repatriated from overseas. An international tribunal con-
victed Japanese political and military leaders for committing atrocities and conducting
an unjust war. See id. at 215-16. In the political realm, bureaucrats connected to the old
order were purged from government posts and new political parties were created. Jailed
dissidents of the old order were granted amnesty. See id. at 216, 217-18.
16. See DOUGLAS MAcARTHUR, REMINIScENCES 399 (1964). MacArthur felt thatJapa-
nese efforts to create a constitution along the lines of democracy and pacifism were half-
hearted and too slow for his liking. The Japanese government's reluctance is probably
attributable to unfamiliarity with democratic institutions and the resulting destruction
of imperial power. See LAWRENcE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE
LAW OFJAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990, at 13 (1996); BEASLEY, supra note 12, at 219.
17. SeeJames E. Auer, Article Nine: Renunciation of War, inJAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 69, 70-71 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993).
18. Id. (quoting OsoMU NISHI, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAw
SYSTEM INJAPAN 73 (1987)). While there is some debate about whether the renunciation
clause was the idea of MacArthur or Prime Minister Shidehara, its submission by MacAr-
thur as a fundamental principle suggests that he supported and believed in it. See id. at
71. There is evidence that Shidehara denied that he was the architect of Article 9. See
Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Commentary, in CONSTITUTIONS OF MODERN STATES: SELECTED TEXTS
AND COMMENTARY 105 (Leslie Wolf-Phillips ed., 1968); HIRoYUKI HATA & Go NAKAGAWA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OFJAPAN 21 (1997).
19. See Auer, supra note 17, at 71. MacArthur claimed at the beginning of the
Korean War that Article 9 did not prevent Japan from preserving "the safety of the
nation." See MACARTHUR, supra note 16, at 304. This shift more likely reflects the
change in U.S. policy with the onset of the Cold War.
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Prime Minister Yoshida, successor to Shidehara, explained that under Arti-
cle 9, "[m]aintenance of security has to be through the Occupation Army
even when attacked since we are not allowed armament. '20 Subsequently,
Ashida Hitoshi, chair of the Constitutional Amendment Committee, intro-
duced the phrases "aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order" and "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph."21 The public explanation for these changes was Japan's sin-
cere desire for a policy of pacifism. 22
The official interpretation of the final draft of what is now Article 9
was that Japan had the right to self-defense under international law, but
had waived it under the language of the second paragraph. 23 Japanese law
schools taught this interpretation. 24 Every Cabinet until 1952 also claimed
that Article 9 prohibited any SDF.25 Article 9 was intended to be an abso-
lute prohibition rather than a flexible standard, and the Japanese govern-
ment presented this to the public. A Japanese military force was
constitutionally impermissible even in the face of aggression.
This original interpretation was short-lived as U.S. priorities changed
from preventing the rearmament of Japan to preparing for the Cold War.26
Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, MacArthur directed Prime
Minister Yoshida to create a 75,000 man National Police Reserve. 27 Prime
Minister Yoshida continued to insist publicly that any form of rearmament,
even defensive, would require a change in the Constitution, but he later
differentiated war-making potential from potential for self-defense. 28 Simi-
larly, Ashida argued in 1953 that his intention in amending Article 9 was
to allow rearmament for self-defense through the language of the amend-
20. Auer, supra note 17, at 72 (quoting COMMISSION OF THE CONSTITUTION. REPORT ON
THE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1958-1964), Doc. No. 46 (1960) . Maki trans.,
1980)). Yoshida's statement cannot be accepted uncritically, since his government was
expected to closely cooperate with the U.S. government. It is unclear whether it
reflected the politics of the occupation or a sincere interpretation of Article 9.
21. Id. at 73.
22. See id. Observers believe that Ashida's real intent was to introduce language that
would in the future allow for self-defense forces. Ashida himself claimed in 1953 that,
contrary to the official government position, the new language permitted defensive
forces. Legislators who adopted the amendment most likely did not support this inter-
pretation. See Robert B. Funk, Note, Japan's Constitution and U.N. Obligations in the
Persian Gulf War: A Case for Non-Military Participation in U.N. Enforcement Actions, 25
CORNELL Ir'L LJ. 363, 374-75 (1992).
23. See Auer, supra note 17, at 74. Funk claims that the use of the term "renounced"
rather than "abolished" suggests a softening of the anti-war sentiment. See Funk, supra
note 22, at 374. This seems difficult to reconcile with the official government policy. A
better explanation of the use of the word "renounced" is that it reflects a waiver of a
sovereign right.
24. See Auer, supra note 17, at 74.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. Over the next few years, a maritime element was added, and the Defense
Agency, the precursor to the SDF, managed the combined force. See id. at 74-75. In
addition to an insistence on rearmament, the Korean War served as the impetus to nego-
tiate a peace treaty and end the U.S. occupation. See BEASLEY, supra note 12, at 224.
28. See Auer, supra note 17, at 74-75.
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ment.29 Finally in 1964, the Commission on the Constitution agreed that
while Article 9 was a worthwhile ideal, it did not prohibit Japan from pro-
viding for its own defense, participating in the United Nations or entering
into the security relationship with the United States.30 The absolute prohi-
bition of Article 9 was replaced with' a more flexible interpretation that
allowed a force for self-defense purposes.3 1
2. The Ambiguity of the Language of Article 9
One possible reason for this shift in interpretation is that the language of
Article 9 is ambiguous.3 2 Ajapanese scholar, Naoki Kobayashi, argues that
there are two primary theories of what is permissible under Article 9,
which he labels Theories A and B. 33 He explains that, under Theory A, the
clause renounces any kind of war since a war, even for self-defense, presup-
poses an international dispute.3 4 He then splits Theory B into two subthe-
ories reflecting differing views as to the meaning of paragraph two. Under
B-i, Japan does not renounce a right to self-defense under the first para-
graph, but the denial of the right to belligerency and to maintain war poten-
tial under the second paragraph effectively extinguishes Japan's right to
protect itself. 35 Under B-2, paragraph two does not act to renounce self-
defense.36 If the original absolutist intent is ignored, each theory is credi-
ble under the language of Article 9.37 Despite the intent of the drafters, the
language of the provision has created legal room for some reinterpretation.
B. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
The legal ambiguity in Article 9 allowed for the creation of the U.S.-Japan
29. See id. at 73. See also Funk, supra note 22, at 374-75; supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
30. See JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT 271 (John M.
Maki ed. & trans., 1980).
31. One possible explanation for the Japanese change of heart could have been that
by 1952, Japan had regained its sovereignty. Under the U.S. occupation, Japan would
have been more likely to interpret the clause in a fashion that was politically more palat-
able to the United States. The timing of the change, though, suggests that the main
impetus was the Korean War and the onset of the Cold War. See Auer, supra note 17, at
74-76.
32. Two phrases of Article 9 are typically considered to be ambiguous. In paragraph
one, the phrase "the Japanese people forever renounce war.., and the threat or use of
force" does not specify whether all war or only offensive war is prohibited. In paragraph
two, the phrase "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained" does not clearly prohibit a defensive capability. KENPo, art. 9.
33. See Naoki Kobayashi, Kempo Kogi, reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 698,
698-700 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976).
34. See id. at 699. Theory A differs from the original absolutist view in that it is a
textual construction argument instead of an intent argument. It is based on the renunci-
ation of war phrase in paragraph one and does not depend upon the meaning of the war
potential clause of paragraph two.
35. See id. This view is consistent with the official explanation given prior to 1952.
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
36. See Kobayashi, supra note 33, at 699.
37. See id.
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Security Treaty, 38 the basis of the Guidelines. When the treaty went into
effect in 1952, the United States had three principal goals: "(1) to prevent
communist expansion and domination... ; (2) to maintain U.S. access to
and through the region; and (3) to foster the spread of market-oriented
economies and liberal democratic political systems."'39 Thus, Japan served
as both a political and economic bulwark against Communism and as an
Asian foothold for U.S. forces.40 In turn, Japan recognized that it was too
weak to defend itself and was concerned about the growing instability in
the world. 4 1 Thus, Article I of the Treaty provided that the United States
would come to the defense of Japan if attacked in exchange for U.S. mili-
tary bases on Japanese territory.4 2
This security arrangement proved problematic. In 1960, when the
agreement was revised into the Mutual Security Treaty,4 3 only a minority
in Japan supported the arrangement, reflecting the pacifist sentiment in
Japan and the fear that the treaty was really a military alliance.4 4 Another
problem was Cold War politics since the United States and Japan had dif-
fering threat perceptions from the communist powers. 45 Japan was able to
work around this issue by following a policy of seikei bunri, a separation of
politics and economics.4 6 Japan supported U.S. Cold War policies while
38. See Security Treaty, Apr. 28, 1952, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3329.
39. Norman D. Levin, Prospects for U.S.-Japanese Security Cooperation, in JAPAN'S
EMERGING GLOBAL ROLE 71, 72 (Danny Unger & Paul Blackburn eds., 1993).
40. See id.
41. See id. The perception of Japanese weakness was as much economic as it was
military. The Japanese government believed that a prerequisite to self-defense was eco-
nomic recovery. A continued U.S. presence allowed Japan to rebuild. See BEASLEY, supra
note 12, at 226.
42. See Security Treaty, supra note 38, art. I. Article I states:
Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the com-
ing into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States
land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East
and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assist-
ance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-
scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or
intervention by an outside power or powers.
Id. See also Levin, supra note 39, at 72 (discussing the current treaty between the United
States and Japan). Levin cautions, however, that the agreement is not just a swap of
protection for bases. He argues that the Treaty is an expression of the common values
that underlie the Japan-U.S. relationship in all areas. See id. at 73.
43. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, 11
U.T.S. 1633.
44. See Mike M. Mochizuki, Japan and the Strategic Quadrangle, in THE STRATEGIC
QUADRANGLE 107, 119 (Michael Mandelbaum ed., Council on Foreign Relations Press,
1995). On the other hand, Japanese conservatives viewed the relationship with resent-
ment, sinceJapan was dependent upon U.S. security guarantees. See BEASLEY, supra note
12, at 237.
45. See Levin, supra note 39, at 73-74.
46. See Mochizuki, supra note 44, at 111. The essence of the policy was that Japan
supported the political goals of the United States but pursued economic relations with
the communist powers. The result of this is still felt today as the United States tries to
match Japanese investment and exports to former communist states. See, e.g., JOHN
BRESNAN, FROM DOMINOES TO DYNAMOS 29-52 (199+) (commenting that "[t]he belief is
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establishing economic relations with the communist bloc.
Another strain on the relationship has been U.S. pressure on Japan to
share the cost of its defense. In order to broaden public support for the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Japanese government has limited its defense
spending to one percent of the GDP, which means that in absolute size
Japan still has one of the largest defense budgets in the world.4 7 By the
early 1980s, there were indications that the one percent of GDP ceiling was
not as sacrosanct as it once was. 48 Additionally, Japan has increased its
patrol of sea lanes to a distance of 1000 nautical miles. 4 9 It has also taken
up much of the financial burden of the U.S. defense commitment. Japan
contributes about $3 billion a year to support U.S. forces, which is seventy-
five percent of the nonlabor costs of the U.S. presence.5 0 Thus, Japan has
expanded the size and scope of its self-defense force and has taken on
much of the financial cost of the security arrangement in response to U.S.
demands for increased burden sharing.5 l
Despite these strains, the success and longevity of the agreement are a
result of its flexible nature. It is shaped around common values that under-
pin the relationship rather than a detailed defense arrangement against a
specific threat.52 The parties have relied upon the Guidelines to allocate
the share of responsibilities vis-a-vis common threats.
5 3
Thus, the two changes - the dilution of the absolutist nature of Article
9 and the growing military relationship with the United States - have led
to results that conflict with the original intent of Article 9. "Due to these
changes, Japan's status as a strong military power in Northeast Asia is
beyond question."5 4 Upon the urging of the United States, Japan has
become a military power despite the constitutional prohibition to the con-
trary. With the adoption of the 1997 Guidelines, the constitutional con-
trols over the scope of Japan's military role within the U.S.-Japan
arrangement have further eroded.
II. The Guidelines
The Guidelines constitute a review of the previous 1978 Guidelines which
sought to create a comprehensive framework for defense cooperation
widespread that the Japanese are 'taking over' the economies of Southeast Asia or, at the
least, are acquiring a dominant position that threatens to reduce significantly the eco-
nomic role of the United States.").
47. See Mochizuki, supra note 44, at 119-20. According to the White Paper Defense
of Japan 1995, the SDF consists of 151,000 ground troops; a maritime force of 43,000
troops and 160 vessels; and an air force of 45,000 troops and 510 planes. See HATA &
NAKAGAWA, supra note 18, at 180.
48. See Tsuneo Akaha, Japan's Nonnuclear Policy, 24 AstU' SuRVEY 852, 859 (1984).
49. See Levin, supra note 39, at 74.
50. See id.
51. External factors such as the resurgence of the Cold War in the early 1980s must
also be considered a factor in Japan's large defense spending.
52. See Levin, supra note 39, at 71-73. Flexibility, however, may not be appropriate
given the limitations imposed by Article 9 of the Constitution.
53. See Joint Statement of the SCC, supra note 1, at 1623-24.
54. Mochizuki, supra note 44, at 120.
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against the communist bloc. 55 President Clinton and then Prime Minister
Hashimoto initiated this review in response to changes in East Asia follow-
ing the end of the Cold War and reductions of U.S. troops deployed in the
region.56 The new Guidelines continue to promote greater defense cooper-
ation between the United States and Japan, but the focus has changed from
containing communism to ending regional instability and preparing
against direct attacks on Japanese territory.57
A. The Text of the Guidelines
The Guidelines are divided into five main parts: I. The Aim of the Guide-
lines; II. Basic Premises and Principles; III. Cooperation Under Normal
Circumstances; IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack AgainstJapan;
and V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.58 Part I
explains that the goal of the Guidelines is "more effective and credible U.S.-
Japan cooperation."5 9 Underlying this stated purpose are Japanese con-
cerns about China and instability on the Korean Peninsula.60 Publicly,
however, the Japanese government has explained that the Guidelines are
purely about self-defense. 61 The United States also maintained this posi-
tion as U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen agreed that the Guidelines
were not aimed at any particular state.62 The purpose of the Guidelines
likely reflects both stated and underlying reasons. With the end of the
Cold War, the U.S. role and, subsequently, the security relationship has
55. See Joint Statement of the SCC, supra note 1, at 1623.
56. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1002-03.
57. See The Interim Report on the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation, §§ I, 11 (June 7, 1997) <http://www2.nttca.com/infomofa/ju/security/
guideline.html> [hereinafter The Interim Report]. Unlike the 1978 Guidelines which
directly identify the communist powers, neither the Interim Report nor the Guidelines
identify any specific threats to regional stability or Japanese security. See id.; Guide-
lines, supra note 1, at 1623.
58. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1621. Part VI discusses the mechanics of imple-
menting the above sections and developing common practices and procedures. This
part is less important for the present discussion since it contains no substantive princi-
ples. Part VII allows for future review of the Guidelines when changes relevant to the
security relationship occur. See id. at 1622.
59. Id. at 1624. See also U.S.-Japan Security Consultative CommitteeJoint Statement
on Defense Cooperation Guidelines (Sept. 23, 1997) <http://www.usai.gov/abtusia/
posts/JAI/wwwt2409.txt>.
60. See New Guidelines Set For U.S.-Japan Alliance, SEATnE TiMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at
A2; James Hackett, Time to Send China a Message, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at A17.
Recent ballistic missile tests by North Korea and China and North Korea's illegal nuclear
weapons program are cited in the Joint Declaration as major sources of instability. See
Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1002-04.
61. See Hackett, supra note 60, at A17.
62. See Press Briefing of Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of
Defense Cohen, Japanese Foreign Minister Obuchi and Japanese Defense Minister
Kyuma (Sept. 23, 1997), <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970923.html>
[hereinafter Albright Press Briefing]. BothJapan and the United States have gone out of
their way to inform China of the progress of the Guidelines and its substantive provi-
sions. Prior to the announcement of the new Guidelines, Prime Minister Hashimoto
visited Beijing for the purpose of mollifying any Chinese concerns. See id. at 4.
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changed, and the nature of the threats posed have shifted to more regional
concerns.
1. Basic Premises and Principles
Part II of the Guidelines, Basic Premises and Principles, establishes the
legal underpinnings of the defense cooperation. 63 The most important is
clause 2 which states that Japan will act within the "limitations of its Con-
stitution" and according to its "defense oriented policy."64 The language of
the clause, however, does not expressly name any specific constitutional
limitation. The second part of the clause suggests that Japan's defensive
posture is a government policy rather than a constitutional mandate. Min-
ister Kyuma, then Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, stated
that the "Guideline Review is not going to alter the interpretation of the
Japanese constitution."65 The impression created is that the force of clause
2 is dependent upon the government's interpretation of the Constitution.
It is not clear from the Guidelines themselves what clause 2 actually limits.
One possible interpretation is suggested by clause 3 of Part II. That
clause says that all actions taken by both states will be in accordance with
international law including the Charter of the United Nations.66 The Char-
ter of the United Nations states that members must refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territorial or political integrity of another state.67
Thus, at the very least, acts of aggression are not permitted under the
Guidelines.
This interpretation of clause 2 is highly unlikely since such an inter-
pretation would render Article 9 meaningless. If that was the only limita-
tion placed on Japan, there would be no debate. This limitation exists on
every other member of the United Nations, yet no other state faces a
dilemma like Japan about how much and what types of force are permissi-
ble. Additionally, clause 2, despite its vagueness, implies that Japan has
greater limitations on the use of force than the United States.68 In order to
reduce redundancy and illogic, clause 2 must mean something more than a
prohibition against the threat or use of force.
63. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1624-25.
64. The clause states that "Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of
its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its
exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles." Id. at 1625
(emphasis added).
65. Press Briefing of Secretary of Defense Cohen and Director General Kyuma (Sept.
24, 1997) <http://www.usia.gov/regional/ea/easec/cohnkyum.htm> [hereinafter Cohen
Press Briefing] (emphasis added). This comment came in response to the following
question from the press, "Minister Kyuma, might we ask you, that any expanded use of
Japanese forces even under your constitution is very controversial in your country is it
not?" Id.
66. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1625.
67. See U.N. CHAR=n art. 2, para. 4.
68. Clause 2 is directed at Japan alone, while Clause 3 applies to both countries.
This suggests that the constitutional limitations are more expansive than the U.N. Char-
ter's prohibition against the use of force in an aggressive manner. See Guidelines, supra
note 1, at 1625.
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2. Cooperation Under Normal Circumstances
Part III of the Guidelines, Cooperation Under Normal Circumstances, is
the least controversial. It provides for information sharing, security coop-
eration, such as arms control, disarmament, and humanitarian relief, and
bilateral programs such as joint exercises and training.69 Its most interest-
ing aspect is Japan's obligation to maintain capabilities necessary for self-
defense.70 Part III continues the Cold War view that Japan is constitution-
ally permitted to maintain a self-defense force, but goes further by requir-
ing Japan to have more than a nominal defense force.
3. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack Against Japan
Part IV, Actions in Response to an Armed Attack Against Japan, also sug-
gests that Japan is constitutionally permitted to provide for its own
defense. When an armed attack occurs, Japan has the primary responsibil-
ity to repel the attack.71 This is one of the main changes instituted in the
Guidelines. 72 Under the old Cold War arrangement, Japan was a military
dependent of the United States with only a small but growing SDF.73 Now,
U.S. forces are limited to supporting Japanese actions and providing rein-
forcements. 74 This change is the practical consequence of a reduced will-
ingness on the part of the United States to bear the financial and personnel
costs of defending its allies, including Japan.
Part IV raises the difficult question of whether Japan is constitution-
ally able under Article 9 to provide for its own defense. The existing Self-
Defense Act provides that the SDF are permitted to engage in the following
activities: (1) defense mobilization; (2) mobilization for the maintenance
of public peace; (3) operation for sea guard; (4) action against violence in
the territorial air space; and (5) mobilization for other activities.75 Two
69. See id. at 1625-26. These three categories divide responsibilities among the two
countries relatively equally and create reciprocal obligations. For example, when either
country participates in humanitarian aid or disaster relief, it will cooperate closely for
mutual support. See id. at 1626.
Although the Guidelines have yet to be implemented by the Diet, a good example of
the new cooperation isiapan's decision in August of 1998 to deploy F-15 fighters over-
seas for the first time since World War II as part of a joint drill over Guam. See Defense
Agency Eyes 1st Overseas Drill By F-15s, JAP.A POL'Y AND POL., Aug. 10, 1998, available in
1998 WL 8032102.
70. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1625 (stating that 'Japan will possess defense
capability within the scope necessary for self-defense").
71. Section IV (2)(1)(a) states: 'Japan will have primary responsibility immediately
to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The
United States will provide appropriate support to Japan." Id. at 1627.
72. See Coleman, supra note 7, at 8A.
73. See Kenneth Pyle, Japan and the Future of Collective Security, in JAPAN's EMERGING
GLOBAL ROLE, supra note 39, at 102. Pyle describes this as the Yoshida Doctrine. Prime
Minister Yoshida traded bases in return for U.S. security guarantees and kept Japan as
lightly armed as possible in order to concentrate on economic growth. See id.
74. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1627. This is consistent with the U.S. policy of
deploying only 100,000 personnel in the region as a whole. SeeJoint Declaration, supra
note 1, at 1003. Surprisingly, some U.S. critics have claimed that the U.S.-Japanese rela-
tionship remains unequal. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 5, at 17A.
75. See HATA & NAKAGAWA, supra note 18, at 180.
Vol. 32
1999 Erosion of Japanese Pacifism
new functions of the SDF illustrate how large a change has occurred under
the Guidelines. First, the Guidelines recognize that a situation abroad may
develop into an armed attack against Japan. 76 Thus, situations abroad
may require preparations and responses in the name of the defense of
Japan. 77 The extent of the permitted responses or preparations is unclear.
Second, the SDF, in conjunction with U.S. forces, will have the responsibil-
ity of protecting sea lanes and the surrounding waters. 78 While Japan has
already given its maritime forces the power to patrol 1000 nautical miles
from its territorial sea,79 the Guidelines are unclear as to the degree of
authority given to Japanese forces. In terms of Article 9, to what extent is
this power constitutionally permissible? For example, could Japan legally
take military action in the future in order to protect sea lanes?80 Assuming
that Article 9 permits self-defense, an interpretive problem arises whenever
the action is somewhere between defensive and offensive action. These
examples show that Japan's potential role under the Guidelines is much
more constitutionally ambiguous than under the old system.
4. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
Part V of the Guidelines is even more troubling from a constitutional per-
spective. In this Part, the United States and Japan agree to take "appropri-
ate measures" in response to "situations in areas surrounding Japan that
will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security."8 1 These
situations are neither defined nor based upon any geographic bounda-
ries,8 2 and the phrase "areas surrounding Japan" is left purposefully
76. The link between an armed attack and a regional situation is established in Sec-
tion IV (1): "Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into
an armed attack against Japan, the two governments will be mindful of the close interre-
lationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses
to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan." Guidelines, supra note 1,
at 1627.
77. Linking the defense of Japan to situations abroad automatically broadens the
definition of Japanese self-defense. The clause means that self-defense is not just limited
to a direct attack against Japanese territory, but also includes conflicts in areas sur-
rounding Japan. See id. Arguably, the broader scope of involvement provides a tenuous
legal basis for Japanese actions abroad.
78. The Guidelines call for both countries to "bilaterally conduct operations for the
defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communications."
Id. at 1628.
79. See Weinberger, supra note 4, at 37.
80. This could be a potential problem in the case of the Spratly Islands. Five Asian
states (not including Japan) lay claim to the islands and. sporadic fighting has occurred.
See Five-Handed Poker in the Spratlys, ECONOMIST, May 21, 1988, at 36. The area is also
the major conduit for Middle Eastern oil destined for Japan and the Pacific. See id. The
Guidelines suggest that Japan could police those waters in order to keep the sea-lanes
open. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1628.
81. Id. at 1630-31.
82. Instead, the focus is situational. See id. at 1630. There are two possible reasons
for this. First, any geographic description is automatically limiting. Second, the states
may have feared that any geographic description might lead third parties to perceive the
Guidelines as targeting them specifically. See Albright Press Briefing, supra note 62.
Prime Minister Obuchi explained to the Diet that the concept is situational because the
geographic scope of the Guidelines "cannot be determined in advance." Obuchi Reiter-
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ambiguous. 83 As a result, in this area of the Guidelines, the provisions for
a regional security arrangement are vague and open-ended.
The Guidelines do not establish limits on Japan as to what constitutes
"appropriate measures." Instead, the Guidelines split appropriate
responses into two categories of activities: (1) Activities Initiated by Either
Government and (2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities.84 Under
the first category, either government may conduct certain activities at its
own discretion. These include relief activity, search and rescue missions,
evacuations of noncombatants from a third country to a safe haven and
enforcement of economic sanctions.8 5 The Guidelines do not clarify how
much force Japan can use in any of these scenarios. 86
The second category deals with Japan's role when the United States
engages in combat operations that influence the peace and security of
Japan. Japan's obligations are divided into three types of activity. First,
Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities such as civilian
airports and ports for temporary use by U.S. and Japanese forces.87 Sec-
ond, Japan will provide rear area support to U.S. forces. This support will
be conducted from areas away from combat such as Japanese territory or
ates Government Stance on Guidelines in Diet, JAPAN POL'Y & PoL.,Jan. 25, 1999, available
in 1999 WL 8895331. Virtually mimicking the language of the Guidelines, Obuchi con-
tinued to state that situations are "limited to those posing an important influence on
Japan's peace and security." Id. Liberal Party leader Ichiro Ozawa criticized this distinc-
tion as "absurd," claiming the concept "areas surrounding Japan" includes China, Tai-
wan, Russia and the Korean Peninsula. See Ozawa Insists Guidelines Based on
Geographical Concept, JAPAN POL'Y & PoL.,Jan. 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8895308;
Ozawa Finds Another Sticking Point, AsAHi SHIMBUN, Jan. 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL
5636432.
83. See Review of Government Alliance a Must, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Oct. 5, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 12802594. At the time of the Guidelines' release, the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) were unable to agree on a
definition of "areas surrounding Japan." Id. In particular, the SDP demanded the
express exclusion of Taiwan from this definition, so that Japan would not have to join
the United States in defending that island in the event of a Chinese attack. See id. As a
result, the concept is vague and broad. For example, a 1999 edition of a Japanese text-
book explained that President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto had "agreed to
expand the scope of the Japan-U.S. security treaty from East Asia to Middle East and
Africa." 5 School Textbooks Get Rewrite of Japan-U.S. Security, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., June
29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8031874. This phrase was rewritten upon the request of
government censors. See id.
84. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1631-32.
85. See id.
86. For example, could Japan under the new Guidelines use force to evacuate its
nationals from an unsafe neighboring country? The international community has gen-
erally accepted this type of use of force. See generally Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law
and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE 4 (1989).
Japan, though, may have waived this right under Article 9 of its Constitution.
87. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1632-33. The government has provided non-
exclusive examples of logistical support. First, private companies would be expected to
provide transport and weapons to U.S. forces. Second, municipalities would be required
to provide access to local ports and airports. Third, public and private hospitals would
be made available to treat injured U.S. troops. See Government Lists Support Areas for
U.S. in War, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Feb. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 7538447.
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international waters.8 8 Third, Japan will conduct intelligence gathering,
surveillance, and minesweeping to support U.S. combat forces.8 9 Thus,
during a military operation that threatens the peace and security of Japan,
Japanese forces will assist the U.S. forces but avoid any direct combat.
As part of these new responsibilities, Japanese forces could be
deployed overseas. However, South Korea has already declared that no Jap-
anese SDF will be permitted to operate on its sovereign territory in the case
of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.90 The South Korean government fears
that Part V of the Guidelines revises the constitutional limitation by permit-
ting Japan to project its power abroad.9 1 Although Prime Minister
Hashimoto said thatJapan could not use military force abroad and the SDF
would not participate in U.N. operations that involve the use of force, he
did not rule out the possibility that Japanese forces could be sent overseas
to support a U.S. combat effort.92 This is a substantial change in policy for
Japan since to date it limited its overseas involvement to U.N. peacekeeping
operations. 93
Taken together, the Guidelines represent a major change in Japanese
defense policy and the distribution of responsibilities between U.S. and
Japanese forces. Japan is now primarily responsible for its own defense
and has discretion to take action in some situations. In more combative
situations, Japanese support could entail deployment abroad and substan-
tial support activities. Although the Guidelines claim to be written within
the limits of the Constitution, they undeniably expand the role of the SDF.
B. The Guidelines in Light of the Original Meaning of Article 9
The drafters of Article 9 did not intend it to be a principle to aspire to
without legal force.9 4 In fact, the Japanese and Americans specifically
debated this point in a meeting between Dr. Matsumoto, General Whitney,
and Commander Hussey:
Matsumoto: [The renunciation of war clause] would be less unsuitable if it
were written in the Preamble. It is unusual to have this principal stated in
the body of the Constitution rather than in the Preamble.
Commander Hussey: You mean, Dr. Matsumoto, that you would prefer to
have it stated merely as a principle.
Matsumoto: Yes, that is so.
88. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1632-33.
89. See id. at 1633.
90. See S. Korea Rejects Japanese Military Operation on Its Territory, supra note 7.
91. See id.
92. See Hashimoto: No Change in Criteria for Use of SDF, YoMium SHIMBUN, Oct. 14,
1997, available in 1997 WL 12802782. While this is the current official position,
Ozava, the leader of the New Frontier Party, believes that Japan's international role
should be broader, particularly in U.N. peacekeeping operations. See id.
93. In 1992, Japan participated in UNTAC, the U.N. military operation in Cambo-
dia. However, Japan deliberately sent only civilian police officers rather than combat
personnel. See Schlesinger & Kanahayashi, infra note 162, at A1O. Japan has also par-
ticipated in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Mozambique. See id.
94. See T. Takayanagi et al., Nihon-koku Kempo Setai no Katei, reprinted in THE JAPA-
NESE LEGAL SysTEM, supra note 33, at 697-98.
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Commander Hussey: While we appreciate that position, we feel that the
renunciation should be incorporated in the basic law itself, that this would
give it real force.
General Whitney: The enunciation of this principle should be unusual and
dramatic. We made it in Chapter II rather than Chapter I of the Constitution
in deference to the Emperor and his place in the hearts of the Japanese peo-
ple. For my own part, and in terms of its decisive importance, I should
prefer the Renunciation of War to be in Chapter I of the new Constitution.95
Both the United States and Japan wanted Article 9 to be an absolute legal
prohibition against the maintenance of any military potential.9 6 Even the
SDF were illegal under a strict interpretation of Article 9.
Considering the original intent of Article 9, the Guidelines are uncon-
stitutional. The maintenance of the SDF even before the implementation of
the Guidelines has been outside the framework of Article 9, since defense
forces constitute land, sea, and air forces, which are precluded by Article 9.
By extension, if the SDF are in themselves unconstitutional, then their
expanded role under the Guidelines must likewise be unconstitutional.
III. The Judiciary, Executive and Legislative Branches' Interpretations
of Article 9
Despite its original intent, since the 1950s, the interpretation of Article 9
was transformed from an absolute prohibition to something else. Much of
this change can be attributed to the roles played by the judicial, executive,
and legislative branches in defining and applying Article 9. Each branch of
government has altered the meaning of "renunciation of war" and the pro-
hibition in paragraph 2 against maintenance of land, sea, and air forces.
Each branch has also created its own framework for analyzing Article 9
questions. Whether each framework is useful depends upon its ability to
answer the following questions: (1) Does Article 9 constitute a renuncia-
tion of the right to self-defense? (2) If it does not, does Article 9 permit
increased military conduct under the Guidelines, including Japanese sup-
port of a U.S. war?
95. Id.
96. Prime Minister Yoshida explained the provision in this manner:
The article concerning the renunciation of war ... does not directly deny the
right to legitimate defense, but since its second paragraph suppresses all rearm-
ament and every right of belligerence that the state may have, the result is that
the Constitution has renounced all sorts of war, even those undertaken as opera-
tions of legitimate defense, and equally renounces all forms of belligerence. The
recent wars were undertaken on the pretext of legitimate defense .... Some
claim that war undertaken in the name of legitimate defense is just, but I con-
sider that such a viewpoint is dangerous.
YosIyuia NoDA, INTRODUCrION TO JAPANEsE LAw 193-94 (1976). The normative force
behind the clause is best seen in the statement by Prime Minister Shidehara that "[t]he
best way to assure peace is to completely and voluntarily suppress all rearmament and
to renounce war instead of having an imperfect and useless military establishment." Id.
at 194. The justifications given by the prime ministers for Article 9 show how the clause
had moral and legal force and reflect an underlying cultural value of pacifism.
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A. The Judiciary
The approach of the Judiciary in Japan is pragmatic and deferential, rather
than legal, to the policies of the Executive. The case law implies that the
SDF is at least de facto constitutional. The Supreme Court in particular is
unwilling to make a direct ruling on Japanese defense policy. While the
lower courts have developed some tests for judging the constitutionality of
a military policy, deference by the Supreme Court to the Executive has
muddied the normative force of Article 9.
1. The "Sunakawa Case"
The Constitution of Japan states in Article 81 that the Supreme Court has
the "power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation
or official act."97 The prevailing view is that this clause permits judicial
;review of statutes and orders concerning defense in terms of Article 9.98
The Supreme Court held that it did have the power to review defense policy
in Sakata v. Japan, known generally as the "Sunakawa Case."99 The case,
though, is more important for determining the legality of the security
arrangement between the United States and Japan.
The Sunakawa incident began when seven local villagers were arrested
for trespassing on a U.S. installation, the Tachikawa air base.' 00 The Tokyo
District Court determined that the seven accused were not guilty, since the
charge of illegal entry was enacted as part of the Security Treaty of 1951,
which the District Court held to be unconstitutional.101 The court nulli-
fied the effect of the treaty because it called for troops to be stationed on
Japanese soil. The treaty, according to the District Court, contravened the
prohibition against land, sea, and air forces in Article 9.102
97. KENPO, art. 81. Some scholars believe that when the Supreme Court declares a
law unconstitutional, the law is either invalidated but still recognized or null and void in
the future and retroactively. See HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITU-
TiONAL PoLIcIEs 108-10 (1989). One author, however, believes that the effect is limited to
the actual parties. See Nobushige Ukai, The Significance of the Reception of American
Constitutional Institutions and Ideas in Japan, in CONSTmTONALISM IN ASIA: ASIAN VIEWS
OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE 119-20 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1979). Thus, it is unclear what
happens when the Supreme Court declares a law unconstitutional. See id. at 119.
98. See Masami Ito, Kempd Nyamon, reprinted in THEJAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra
note 33, at 704.
99. See Sakata v. Japan, 13 KEISHtO 3225 (1959), reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 709. Ultimately, the Court took the position that the literal
words of Article 81 of the Constitution did not permit it to review treaties and it deferred
instead to the judgment of the Executive. See id. This created a narrow exception similar
to that of the political question doctrine which would dominate Article 9 litigation from
then on. See id.
100. Japan and the United States had agreed to extend the runway at Tachikawa
which meant that private property had to be expropriated. When the Japanese govern-
ment attempted to survey the land, local villagers opposed to the plan rioted and entered
the base. See id.
101. See id.
102. The Tokyo District Court took the traditional, absolutist view of Article 9 that the
clause prohibited any war potential on the territory ofJapan. See id. While the decision
was consistent with the intent of the drafters, it was potentially embarrassing, since it
invalidated the Mutual Security Treaty and called into question the legality of the SDF.
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The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that Article 9 did not prohibit
Japan from gaining security guarantees from another country.10 3 The
Court held that war potential prohibited by the second paragraph of Article
9 was limited to that over which Japan can exercise command and control
but did not proscribe the use of foreign troops, even if stationed on the
territory of Japan. 10 4 The Court qualified this command and control test
in the following passage:
the said article renounces what is termed therein war and prohibits the
maintenance of what is termed war potential; naturally, the above in no way
denies the inherent right of self-defense, which our country possesses as a
sovereign nation. The pacifism of our Constitution has never provided for
either defenselessness or nonresistance. 10 5
This dicta has led many to argue that by making self-defense an exception
to the command and control test, the Court legalized the SDF.10 6
Consequently, the Sunakawa case limits Article 9 in two main
respects. First, Article 9 has no bearing on the U.S. presence in Japan, so
long as Japan does not exercise command and control over the forces.
Under the Court's reasoning, Japan can contract out its defense require-
ments yet stay within the constitutional framework. Second, the Court
explicitly stated that Japan has an inherent right to self-defense. However,
the court did not hold that this right extends to the maintenance of the
SDF. 10 7
2. Later Cases Interpreting the Sunakawa Dicta
Other courts have grappled with the constitutionality of Japan's defense
policy. In Ito et al. v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, known
as the "Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case I", 108 plaintiffs challenged the gov-
ernment's decision to construct a Nike anti-aircraft base in a forest
103. See id. at 711. Since the Supreme Court found a technical resolution to this
question in the language of Article 81 of the Constitution, these findings were legally
unnecessary, suggesting that the Court was concerned about the constitutional ques-
tions raised by the lower court.
104. See Sunakawa, reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 33, at 711.
105. Id. at 710. Note that the language of the court is strikingly similar to
Kobayashi's Theory B2 which differentiated between war potential and potential for self-
defense. See Kobayashi, supra note 33, at 698-700; supra notes 34-37 and accompanying
text. The Sunakawa case may resolve some of the ambiguity about Article 9 and the
command and control test may be the limit as to how farJapan can go. However, it fails
to account for the intent of U.S. and Japanese drafters of the clause
106. In the Eniwa case before the Sapporo District Court, the prosecution argued that
the right to self-defense established in Sunaawa meant that the SDF were constitutional.
In Eniwa, two ranchers were charged with cutting telephone lines to a local SDF base.
The Sapporo District Court ignored the Article 9 question by determining that the tele-
phone lines were not military property. See Hideo Wada, Decisions Under Article 9 of the
Constitution - The Sunakawa, Eniwa and Naganuma Decisions, 9 LAw IN JAPAN 117, 123-
25 (1976).
107. See Funk, supra note 22, at 380-82.
108. Ito et al. v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 712 HANREI JIHO 24
(Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973), translated and reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 16,
at 83.
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reserve. 10 9 One claim by the plaintiffs was that the existence of a military
base violated Article 9.110
The District Court first determined that acts of state such as the crea-
tion of the SDF were not beyond the realm of judicial review simply
because of its "highly political nature." '' The court then determined the
constitutionality of the SDF:
IT]he SDF is a military force, since it is clearly "an organization of men and
material which has as its purpose combat activity involving physical force
against a foreign threat." Accordingly, the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF
correspond to the "war potential" of "land, sea and air forces," maintenance
of which is forbidden by Article 9, 2 of the Constitution. 112
Attempting to be consistent with the Sunakawa decision, the court
explained that the right to self-defense was not directly related to military
power.'1 3 Instead, the right to self-defense addressed domestic concerns
about the social, economic, and political welfare of the country and inter-
national concerns regarding its world position and diplomacy." 4 The
court reasoned that to maintain a distinction between military force for
defensive versus aggressive purposes would render the phrase "war poten-
tial" objectively meaningless." 5
This decision was overturned on appeal to the Sapporo High Court.1 6
In the Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case II, the court determined that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue on non-constitutional grounds. 117 In
dicta, however, the court expressed its view on the constitutionality of the
SDF. The court expressed two basic theories of interpretation of the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 9, a positive theory and a negative theory:
the positive theory is based on the view that the Constitution makes paci-
fism.., the ideal for which we risk our existence, and that this is possible
even under the present conditions of international society. The negative the-
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 93-94. Here the court was distinguishing the narrow political question
exception created by the Sunakawa court for treaties. The issue here was the constitu-
tionality of the SDF which was created by statute. Since laws are under the review power
of the courts under Article 81, the court could determine the constitutionality of the law
that created the SDF. See id.
112. Id. at 111. The court seems to be embracing Kobayashi's Theory BI that the
prohibition of war potential encompasses defensive forces. See Kobayashi, supra note 33,
at 698-700; supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. In so doing, the court is indi-
rectly contradicting the theoretical underpinnings of the Sunakawa decision.
113. See Ito et al., supra note 108, translated and reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note
16, at 111.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 97-98. This language again seems to be a rejection of Theory B2 and
the Sunahawa reasoning despite its attempt at reconciling the two decisions. See
Kobayashi, supra note 33, at 698-700.
116. See Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries v. Ito et al., 27 GyosAI REISHU
1175 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Aug. 5, 1976), translated and reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra
note 16, at 112.
117. The court held that the substitute facilities created upon the loss of the forest
reserve compensated the local farmers and villagers for any loss. See id. at 114.
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ory is based on the view that our Constitution demands that we respect the
ideal of pacifism, but in the real international society there is danger of
unjustified surprise aggression, and defensive action in such a situation is
natural. One cannot say that it is necessarily clear on which of these two
views our Constitution was based; because both of these theories have their
rationales, we must say that the first sentence of Article 9, paragraph 2 as it
concerns the maintenance of war potential for self-defense, is impossible to
interpret clearly and unequivocally. 1 18
The court did not decide which theory best explains the language of Article
9.119 This indecision validates the constitutionality of the SDF, since the
court found the second paragraph to be ambiguous. Not only did this
legalize the ambiguity of the language, but it ignored the original absolutist
intent.
The Sapporo High Court also created its own political question theory
about when a court can review defense policy. The court explained that if
the purpose of the SDF was not clearly aggressive, it could not be reviewed
since it pertained to an act of state. 120 Under this standard, the Guidelines
would have to be on their face aggressive in purpose to be judicially
reviewable.
3. The Emergence of a Policy of Avoidance
Since Sunakawa, the Supreme Court has avoided resolution of any Article 9
issues. 12 1 On appeal of Nike II to the Supreme Court, the court decided
the narrow issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing.12 2 The Court did
not comment upon the lower courts' contradictory views of Article 9.123
The Supreme Court chose not to decide whether the SDF were
constitutional.
In the Hyakuri Air Base case, the Supreme Court again avoided decid-
ing this constitutional conflict. 124 Appellants sued Japan and Fujioka, a
private individual, for recision of a contract for the sale of land. The land
118. Id. at 121.
119. The court's definition of the negative view seems analogous to Theory B-2. How-
ever, the positive view seems like a combination of both Theory A (self-defense presup-
poses war; war is renounced; thus it is illegal) and Theory B-1. It is significant that the
court seems to be adopting Kobayashi's thesis that neither theory is particularly strong
and arguments can be made for either interpretation. See Kobayashi, supra note 33, at
698-700. It also seems to undercut the theoretical underpinnings of the Sunakawa case
by putting all three theories on even footing.
120. See Minister of Agriculture, supra note 116, at 1175, translated and reprinted in
BEER & ITOH, supra note 16, at 121. The court relies on Sunahawa for this general polit-
ical question doctrine, but it seems inconsistent with the logic of the Supreme Court. In
effect, the court is avoiding the issue: not only is Article 9 ambiguous, but it is also too
politically sensitive for the court to handle.
121. See Christopher A. Ford, The Indeginization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese
Experience, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3, 41 (1996).
122. See Uno et al. v. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, 36 MINSHU 1679
(Supreme Court, First Petty Bench, Sept. 9, 1982), translated and reprinted in BEER &
ITOH, supra note 16, at 127.
123. See id.
124. See Ishizuka et al v. Japan et al, 43 MINSH 385 (Supreme Court, Third Petty
Bench, June 20, 1989), translated and reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 16, at 130.
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was subsequently sold to the SDF for the creation of a military base. 125
The Court circumvented the constitutional claim by determining that Arti-
cle 9 is not designed to apply directly to private law such as a breach of
contract claim.12 6
The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of the
SDF.12 7 One interpretation of this policy of avoidance is that the constitu-
tionality of the SDF is implied in Japan's inherent right to self-defense. 128
Alternatively, this approach could be viewed as an attempt by the Court to
avoid constitutional issues by focusing on more technical grounds for deci-
sion. 129 The Court's reticence may also reflect its unwillingness to lay
down a general rule about Article 9 until more cases and opposing views
are considered.' 30 Regardless of the underlying reasons, the practical
effect is the continued existence of the SDF and unfettered power by the
Cabinet and the Diet to determine defense policy.
4. Political Question Doctrine
On a broader level, judicial deference may reflect the belief that defense
policy is a political question and not capable of judicial resolution. 13 1 The
implications of this are twofold. First, the Supreme Court is able to adjudi-
cate the cases while avoiding any political backlash.132 Second, by ignor-
ing Japan's evolving defense policy, the Court can avoid delineating what is
and is not constitutional. The only attempt at line drawing is the High
Court's rule in Nike II: unless the purpose is clearly aggressive, there is no
judicial review. 133 The District Court, however, correctly points out in
Nike I that the distinction between aggressive and nonaggressive military
125. See id. at 130-31.
126. See id. at 135.
127. See Funk, supra note 22, at 381. Funk observes this trend of the Supreme Court
in the Eniwa case, the Uno case, and a case known as Suzuki. See id. at 381-82.
128. See id. at 382. This would be consistent with the B2 theory and would avoid the
tightrope decision making seen in Nike I. This may resolve the question of the existence
of the SDF, but it fails to address the Guidelines.
129. See id. at 382, n. 127. However, Funk seems to discount this interpretation,
arguing instead that the Supreme Court could have struck down the SDF as unconstitu-
tional. See id. Another interpretation is that the Supreme Court acted in this manner to
avoid the legal ramifications of upholding the SDF in light of Article 9's language.
130. See Ukai, supra note 97, at 127.
131. This can be seen in the Nike Missile Case II and also in Sunagawa. In Sunagawa,
the Supreme Court was unwilling to declare a treaty unconstitutional, believing instead
that the "matter must be entrusted to the decision of the Cabinet . . . and of the
Diet ... and it ultimately must be left to the political review of the sovereign people."
Sunagawa v. Japan, 13 KEiSHO 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959), translated and
reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 16, at 93.
132. The judiciary is reluctant to decide politically-charged issues since: 1) the Lib-
eral Democratic Party has nearly dominated Japanese politics since World War II, so
most of the judges identify with this party's philosophy; and 2) judges on the Supreme
Court are subject to review by the electorate every 10 years, so they are far from immune
from politics. See Funk, supra note 22, at 383.
133. See Minister of Agriculture, supra note 116, at 1175, translated and reprinted in
BEER & ITOH, supra note 16, at 121.
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forces is untenable, 134 and the standard has yet to be accepted by the
Supreme Court. Even if one assumes that the SDF is constitutional, it does
not necessarily follow that deployment abroad of those forces is constitu-
tional. Yet the lack of a clear judicially-created framework and the ten-
dency of the Supreme Court to avoid addressing constitutional issues
means that many decisions about Japanese defense policy, including the
Guidelines, will pass unchallenged.
5. Constitutional Transformation
Another explanation for the Supreme Court's avoidance of a direct ruling
on the constitutionality of defense forces is constitutional transformation.
This theory has been used by Japanese scholars to explain how the Consti-
tution has survived without amendments. 135 Under constitutional trans-
formation, particular articles are reinterpreted while keeping the text
intact.136 Not all types of interpretations are constitutional transforma-
tions. A change within the framework of the constitutional norm is consti-
tutional interpretive change, while a change outside the framework is
constitutional transformation. 137 Constitutional transformation can take
place if two conditions exist. First, the normative function of the provision
must become purely superficial, i.e. its effectiveness is lost. Second, some
other meaning must have replaced the original meaning. 138
Kasuya argues that the effectiveness of the Renunciation of War clause
in Article 9 has been forfeited over a long period of time. However, this, by
itself, is not transformation. Instead, there must be popular belief as to
some new normative meaning of Article 9.139 Conclusive evidence of
transformation would exist if the Supreme Court were to deliver a direct
opinion recognizing the constitutionality of the SDF.140
The application of constitutional transformation theory to Article 9
can explain why the Supreme Court avoided a direct ruling on the constitu-
tionality of Japanese militarism. First, the Court may fear the application
of constitutional transformation theory. It may not be prepared to give a
new meaning to Article 9 which is outside the original framework of the
134. See Ito et al., supra note 108, translated and reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note
16, at 105.
135. See Kasuya, supra note 11, at 1.
136. See id. See also Ford, supra note 121, at 58.
137. See Kasuya, supra note 11, at 15.
138. See id. at 16.
139. See id. at 20. Unlike Kobayashi who is looking at the textual arguments that can
be made, see Kobayashi, supra note 33, at 698-700, Kasuya emphasizes the normative
intent of the language. See Kasuya, supra note 11, at 20.
140. See Kasuya, supra note 11, at 21. Kasuya argues that the battle in the lower
courts is evidence of the constitutional transformation phenomenon, but consensus on
the new meaning of Article 9 has not been achieved. See id. at 26. Combining the two
theories (textualist and constitutional transformation), the following matrix emerges: At
its inception, the normative force of Article 9 was absolutist and the only consistent
textual theories were A and B1. The case law and changing political landscape suggest
that the normative force has changed, but no consensus exists as to a new meaning.
Now all theories have equal force in explaining the textual meaning of Article 9.
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provision's norm. Alternatively, the Court may believe that it lacks the
political consensus to make such a ruling. Again the practical effect is that
the SDF continue to exist. The legal effect is that Article 9 cannot be inter-
preted literally. However, no alternative meaning clearly exists. Thus, the
SDF and the Guidelines are somewhere in the margins of constitutionality.
Regardless of the rationale at work, the Supreme Court appears
unwilling to address defense issues. While recognizing a right to self-
defense in Sunakawa, the Court has provided no framework for the lower
courts when dealing with SDF constitutionality challenges. If a test case
did arise, the most likely outcome would be judicial deference to
policymakers.
This is problematic for Japanese constitutionalism. Unlike the rest of
the democratic world, Japan's defense policy not only involves political
issues but is also a constitutional question. The judicial framework has the
benefits of ease and at least de facto recognition of the constitutionality of
the SDF. However, as a consequence, Article 9 loses much of its normative
power and the constitutional aspects of defense issues are undermined.
B. The Executive
Judicial deference has led various prime ministers and the cabinets to view
restrictions upon the deployment of Japanese troops as a matter of govern-
ment policy rather than a legal necessity. This approach has been preva-
lent for nearly forty years.141 Without fear of judicial nullification, the
government has been free to establish a security relationship with the
United States in response to Cold War threats.142
This view of defense as a government policy issue developed gradu-
ally. First, the Cabinet officially recognized Japan's right to self-defense
four and a half years prior to Sunakawa despite the large public debate on
the subject.143 Later, the government explained that Japan had never
rejected its right to self-defense and, thus, justified its increased expendi-
ture on the SDF.144 In the 1980s, Prime Minister Nobosuke explained that
while the government's policy barred nuclear weapons, the Constitution
did not prohibit some weapons for self-defense. 145 In 1994, then-Prime
Minister Tomiichi Murayama declared that the SDF were constitutional "in
141. See Auer, supra note 17, at 76.
142. See supra Part IlI.A.1.
143. This is illustrated by the official Cabinet policy statement on Article 9 released
in June of 1955:
The Constitution while denouncing war, has not denounced war for self-
defense... To check armed attack in event such an attack from outside is self-
defense itself, and is entirely different from settling international disputes.
Hence, the case of military power as a means of defending the nation when the
nation has been attacked by military power is not counter to the Constitution.
Auer, supra note 17, at 76.
144. See DAVID M. O'BRiEN, To DREAm OF DREAMs: RE uGI oUs FREEDOM AND CoNsrrru-
TIONAL PoLnics IN POS1mWA JAPAN 148 (1996).
145. See Auer, supra note 17, at 76. Japan's non-nuclear principles were announced
as a self-imposed limitation rather than as any constitutional prohibition. See generally
Akaha, supra note 48, at 859.
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light of the changing international situation and the people's growing
understanding."'146 This is a vastly different statement than the one made
earlier, saying that the Constitution would have to be amended to allow for
the SDF. 14 7 The Executive branch's policies suggest thatJapanese pacifism
was a political tactic rather than a constitutional mandate.
An example of the Cabinet's treatment of constitutional challenges can
be seen in its response to the public outcry against the Vietnam War. The
Japanese people demonstrated against the war primarily because Japan
was a "silent partner" in America's war.148 Okinawa served as a major
staging ground for U.S. bombing missions, and many U.S. troops and
equipment first passed through Japan. 149 The Japanese government sold
arms to the United States and issued propaganda against the Viet Cong.' 50
As a result, variousJapanese organizations, especially religious and student
groups, regularly demonstrated against the war and Japan's involve-
ment.' 5 1 OneJapanese protestor accused Japan and the Japanese people of
being guilty of complicity in the war. 152
TheJapanese government did not reevaluate the U.S.-Japanese security
relationship as a result of popular discontent. Instead, Prime Minister Sato
struck a deal with President Nixon. They agreed that the security relation-
ship would continue with Japan as the "silent partner" in exchange for the
return of Okinawa which had been held by the U.S. since World War II.i1 3
In effect, Japan bought political concessions for its continued complicity in
the Vietnam War.
The Guidelines may be similar to the U.S.-Japan deal regarding the
Vietnam War. The expanded role of the SDF may be a tradeoff for some
U.S. concessions. The Joint Declaration explains that the Guidelines
review is only one part of a larger bilateral security agreement which
includes a study on ballistic missile defense, exchange of fighter plane tech-
nology, and, most importantly, a reduced U.S. presence in Okinawa. 15 4 If
so, the Guidelines represent a political compromise between the United
States and the Cabinet. Therefore, the Guidelines may be a new example of
the Cabinet determining the scope of Article 9 and using the constitutional
limit as a means of obtaining U.S. political concessions. l5 5
146. O'BPmEN, supra note 144, at 175.
147. See id. at 175-76.
148. See generally THOMAS R. H. HAVENS, FIRE AcRoss THE SEA: THE VIETNAM WAR AND
JAPAN 1965-1975 (1987).
149. See id. at 84-106.
150. See id. at 128.
151. See id. at 115-22. Protesters held teach-ins at schools and community centers.
See id.
152. See id. at 120. Others expressed similar sentiments through "a regular pattern of
appeals, demonstrations, letter-writing and forums." Id.
153. See id. at 199-204.
154. See also joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1003-04. The Okinawa provision is a
result of the large public outcry against U.S. military bases after the rape ofJapanese girl
by several U.S. servicemen. See id.
155. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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However, the Cabinet is not unfettered in determining defense policy.
Protests against the Vietnam War illustrate that the Executive is held
accountable to public opinion on defense issues. During the Gulf War,
Prime Minister Kaifu attempted to introduce legislation that would allow
for the SDF to participate in the U.N. coalition against Iraq.15 6 Over
20,000 people protested against the plan and, ultimately, widespread pub-
lic belief that the law was unconstitutional killed the bill. 15 7 Nevertheless,
judicial deference on the issue means that the Executive is institutionally
unchecked.
C. The Diet
The Diet also expanded the role of Japanese forces. Although efforts to
pass a U.N. participation bill during the Gulf War failed, the Diet did pass
a law enabling Japan to participate in the U.N. peacekeeping operation and
election monitoring in Cambodia (UNTAC)."5 8 The Diet passed the U.N.
Peace Cooperation law in June 1992 which allowed for SDF participation
in peacekeeping operations.' 5 9 Under this law, Japanese forces can engage
in peace-enforcing operations since "Article 9 prohibits Japan to resort to
'the threat or use of force."160 This language is similar to that used by the
U.N. Charter. 16 1 As a result, the new law implicitly reduced the meaning
of Article 9 to the same limitation imposed upon every other state in the
world by the United Nations.
This law enabled Japan to send 600 civilian police officers to Cambo-
dia. Consequently, many Japanese reacted strongly against the new law
when the Khmer Rouge killed two Japanese officers. 16 2 The public urged
the government to withdraw from the mission or to ask UNTAC to deploy
Japanese forces only in safe, noncombat areas. 163 Some Japanese argued
that, comparable to World War II, wayward leaders had once again led
Japan down a militarist path.164 However, Japanese forces remained in
156. See Funk, supra note 22, at 383-87.
157. See id. at 388.
158. See Auer, supra note 17, at 79.
159. See Law Concerning Cooperation for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other
Operations, June 15, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 215. See also Auer, supra note 17, at 79.
160. Law Concerning Cooperation for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other
Operations, supra note 159, at 215. However, Japanese participation is contingent upon
the existence of a ceasefire, consent of the disputants, and the strict adherence to impar-
tiality. If any of these conditions are not met, the Japanese forces must leave. In addi-
tion, SDF peacekeepers are limited to using weapons necessary to protect their lives. See
Hisashi Owada, Japan's Constitutional Power to Participate in Peace-Keeping, 29 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 271, 278 (1997); see also Aldho Shibata, Japanese Peacekeeping Legisla-
tion and Recent Developments in U.N. Operations, 19 YALEJ. INT'L L. 307 (1994).
161. See U.N. CHARTE art. 2, para. 4.
162. See generally Paul Blustein, Japan: Is Cambodia Too Costly?, WASH. PosT, May 8,
1993, at A15; Jacob M. Schlesinger & Masayoshi Kanahayashi, Japan's Debate on Forces
in Cambodia Shows Nation's Uncertainty, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1993, at A10; Japanese
Opposition Party Team Arrives, DAiLY REPORT: EAST AsIA (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service), May 17, 1993, at 41.
163. See Blustein, supra note 162, at A15.
164. See Schlesinger & Kanahayashi, supra note 162, at A10.
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Cambodia and have served as peacekeepers elsewhere. The Diet's ability to
use this new law as a means of advancing defense policy may be limited by
public opinion in a similar fashion to the Cabinet, but it is not clear
whether public opinion alone is strong enough to keep the SDF from going
overseas.
IV. Constitutionality - The Three Frameworks
Each of the three branches has created their own framework of analysis for
Article 9 issues. The first, the Judiciary, is legally framed but is the least
helpful of the three. The second and third, the Executive and Legislative,
explain official Japanese policy but assume its legality. While the legal pre-
cedent and past practice indicate that the SDF are constitutional, none of
the three branches offer any clear legal guidance as to how to evaluate the
Guidelines.
Notably, none of the three institutions attempt to preserve the original
intent of Article 9: an absolute prohibition against maintaining war poten-
tial. 165 Since the Guidelines allow a defense force capable of repelling an
armed attack and authorize Japanese forces to participate in regional con-
flicts, a strict interpretation of Article 9 is likely to render them illegal. The
Guidelines constitute war potential for Japan and thus are unconstitutional.
A. The Likely Judicial Approach to the Guidelines
The Supreme Court and the lower courts have offered a limited framework
for analysis. First, the Nike II case suggests that the Guidelines are uncon-
stitutional only if their stated purpose is military aggression. 166 This
"aggressive purpose test" for judicial scrutiny is a difficult hurdle to meet,
since the Guidelines state that the objectives in implementing them are
defense and regional security. There is nothing patently aggressive about
the Guidelines despite the expansion of SDF power. 167 If this test is the
legal standard, it is very likely that the Guidelines would survive this type
of scrutiny, and the Judiciary would defer to the judgement of the Cabinet.
Similarly, if Sunakawa provides at least tacit approval for the SDF, then
perhaps the Guidelines are constitutional under certain limitations. Such
a conclusion is uncertain since Sunakawa and the later cases do not define
what is a permissible military aim beyond the point of "pure" self-
defense. 168 One possible means of line-drawing is the command and con-
165. This corresponds to Kobayashi's Theory BI: war potential includes both offen-
sive and defensive forces. See Kobayashi, supra note 33, at 698-700. The strength of this
position is that it fits neatly with the original normative intent of the provision.
166. See Minister of Agriculture, supra note 116, at 1175, translated and reprinted in
BEER & ITOH, supra note 16, at 121.
167. The language of the section headings (phrases such as "cooperation," "actions in
response to an armed attack against Japan" and "important influence on Japan's peace
and security") implies that the Guidelines favor the status quo and are meant to apply
only in response to some external threat. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1624.
168. Sunakawa recognized Japan's inherent right to self-defense despite the constitu-
tional requirement of pacifism. However, the court offered no guidance as to what it
meant. See Sunakawa, supra note 99, reprinted in THE JAP'ANEsE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note
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trol test.16 9 This would require a case-by-case definition of whether the
particular operation goes beyond the right to self-defense.
This approach is problematic for several reasons. First, it requires a
level of judicial scrutiny of defense issues that Japan has never exper-
ienced. Second, even if a court is willing to address the Article 9 question,
it forces the court to adjudicate on the legality of a specific, possibly on-
going activity. This could potentially embarass the Cabinet and the United
States. The result justifies the use of political question theory and exposes
a fundamental flaw in the Japanese constitutional scheme. It is unreasona-
ble to expect a court to nullify military action taken under the Guidelines
when Japanese security and defense are at stake.
This problem is also apparent when one considers the application of
constitutional transformation to Article 9. Constitutional transformation
theory implies that the public's perception of what is permissible has
changed since Sunakawa.170 Article 9 may be construed more liberally
today. The linkage provision of the Guidelines which connects Japanese
self-defense to regional stability suggests, under constitutional transforma-
tion, some broader views of self-defense.17 1 The difficulty emerges when
the courts are left to determine the extent to which the "transformed" Arti-
cle 9 permits self-defense, especially given the Supreme Court's unwilling-
ness to decide Article 9 questions.
By avoiding the issue in the past, the Judiciary has few options if con-
fronted by a challenge to the Guidelines. It has enabled the Cabinet to
denigrate Article 9 to nothingness. Most likely, the Judiciary is left power-
less to confront the constitutionality of the Guidelines. Thus, it is possible
that the courts will avoid any challenge to the Guidelines, resulting in, at
least, tacit constitutionality.
B. The Approach Taken by the Cabinet
The Hashimoto Cabinet submitted three bills to the Diet in April 1998
designed to implement the Guidelines. The government continues to main-
tain that the Guidelines are constitutional because they are consistent with
its interpretation of Article 9.172 This pragmatic approach allows Japan to
respond to changes in the world. It is not, though, a legal approach. While
governments often offer their own interpretation of a constitutional provi-
sion, the Japanese government has not explained the scope of Article 9 in
any useful way.
The most troubling aspect of the Guidelines is the provision that
allows the United States to use Japanese airfields and ports to conduct a
33, at 711. This is supported by the Sapporo District Court's conclusion in Nike I that
the right of self-defense does not mean that the SDF is legal. See Ito et al., supra note
108, translated and reprinted in BEER & ITOH, supra note 16, at 111.
169. See Sunakawa, supra note 99, reprinted in THEJAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note
33, at 711.
170. See Kasuya, supra note 11, at 20.
171. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
172. See Cohen Press Briefing, supra note 65.
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regional war.173 This raises the spectre of Japan's complicity in the Viet-
nam War and may trigger widespread public protest. 174 However, a public
outcry against the Guidelines is unlikely. In the case of Vietnam, the pub-
lic reacted to a war being fought from Japanese territory. In contrast, the
Guidelines are only plans for some future, hypothetical contingency. This
lack of immediacy means that the public reaction will not occur when the
implementing legislation is debated in the Diet.175 Thus, the public may
not exercise the same sort of checks in this instance as it has in the past,
since the Guidelines are not a response to any particular crisis. Even if the
public demonstrates against the passage of the Guidelines, the Vietnam
example shows that a demonstration is probably not enough to prevent
their enactment into law. 176
C. The Likely Approach by the Diet
Since the Judiciary is unlikely to affirm a challenge to the constitutionality
of the Guidelines and the Cabinet has passed three implementing bills,
only the Diet is likely to consider the legality of the proposed legislation.
However, the Diet's view of Article 9, as evidenced by the U.N. Participa-
tion Law, is very broad. The sole limitation on Japanese military forces is
that they cannot threaten or undertake aggressive military action. In this
light, the Guidelines are facially constitutional. Only actual conduct that
would constitute the threat or use of force would be questionable. Thus,
even the Diet is unlikely to challenge the constitutionality of the
Guidelines.
However, passage of the Guidelines in the Diet will not be a mere
endorsement of the Cabinet's defense policy. Although the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party (LDP) still represents the majority in the Diet, the 1998 elec-
tions have given rise to a strengthened opposition. The opposition parties,
Democratic Party of Japan and Komeito, have argued that if the concept
"areas surrounding Japan" is not defined, it could be contrary to Article
9.177 It appears that this charge, though, is designed only to gain leverage
in the debate, and U.S. experts do not expect any changes to the broad and
173. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1632-33.
174. See generally Havens, supra note 148. The difference now is that Japan is no
longer a "silent partner" in an U.S. War.
175. The examples of the Gulf War and Cambodia support this. When the bill for
Japanese participation in the Gulf War was introduced, the legislation was in response
to a very real crisis. See Funk, supra note 22, at 384-87. In the case of Cambodia, the
decision to participate came after the law. Public outcry did not occur until Japanese
forces were already deployed. See Schlesinger & Kanahayashi, supra note 162, at 10.
176. It is much more likely that public protest and dissatisfaction would lead to fur-
ther negotiations with the United States about the security relationship rather than a
public debate about the Article 9 implications. Consider the case of the September 1995
abduction and rape of the 12 yeAr old Okinawan school girl by three U.S. servicemen.
Public calls for the removal of U.S. forces were ignored, but gave Japan leverage to rene-
gotiate the security relationship. See, e.g., Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1004.
177. See Debate on Guidelines Bill Drags On,JEI REPORT, Feb. 5, 1999, available in 1999
WL 11606503.
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vague scope of the Guidelines. 178
In fact, the deal that is beginning to be formulated in the House of
Representatives avoids the constitutional issue altogether. A tentative
amendment would obligate the government to withdraw SDF units if a
majority of both the House of Representatives and the House of Council-
lors voted for withdrawal. 179 While there is still discussion about whether
the principles of the Guidelines also apply to Japanese support of U.N.
enforcement operations, 180 the tenor of the debate suggests that the Diet
will not vote down the Guidelines as unconstitutional.
V. Implications of the Constitutionality of the Guidelines
Each branch of the Japanese government is most likely to determine that
the Guidelines are constitutional despite their inconsistency with the origi-
nal intent of the Article. Holding them constitutional can have dangerous
ramifications for Japan. First, it potentially has a destabilizing effect on
domestic politics in the long run. Second, the original constitutional
scheme of checks and balances is weakened as the meaning of Article 9 is
watered down. Lastly, the assumed constitutionality of the Guidelines may
undermine the notion of Japan as a pacific state.
A. Domestic and Institutional Consequences
There are several implications of the assumed legality of the Guidelines.
First, Japan is able to effectuate a major change in defense policy without
having a serious national debate about the proper role of the SDF.181 This
allows Japan to maintain the spirit of Article 9 without examining the limi-
tations it imposes on Japan's defense policy. In addition, the nearly contin-
uous dominance of the LDP has insured that no real defense debate
occurs.1 82 This lack of debate and the current alliance structure of the
Cabinet threatens to undermine the present government. Prior to the resig-
nation of Prime Minister Hashimoto, the ruling alliance of the LDP, the
Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the Pioneers had been unable to agree
on any limitations to the Guidelines.' 83 Further, the current majority coa-
lition of the LDP and the Liberal Party disagree on security issues since the
Guidelines' implementing legislation is a product of the old alliance of the
LDP and the SDP without the involvement of the Liberal Party. 18 4 Trying
178. See id. The newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun also expects no change in the language
of "areas surrounding Japan" because the vagueness is essential to the deterrent effect of
the Guidelines. See Maintenance of Peace Crucial, YoMunu SHIMBUN, Jan. 28, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 5465818.
179. See SDF Withdrawal Needs Support of Both Houses, PERIscoPE-DAILY DEFENsE NEvs
CAPsuLEs, Feb. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8510223.
180. See Governmental Flip-Flops Fostering Distrust, MAINICHi DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12,
1999, available in 1999 WL 7538519.
181. See Carpenter, supra note 5, at 17A.
182. See Pyle, supra note 73, at 105.
183. See Review of Governmental Alliance a Must, supra note 83.
184. See Accord Affects Defense Debate, AsAmi SHIMBUN, Jan. 23, 1999, available in 1999
WL 5636433.
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to implement the Guidelines without a debate leading to a consensus on
their limits can unravel the alliance or leave Japan impotent on security
issues. 185
There are also two related institutional implications of the supposed
constitutionality of the Guidelines. First, judicial deference has given the
Cabinet an unfettered ability to interpret Article 9.186 The Cabinet's policy
on the Guidelines reveals that Article 9 is only an ideal rather than a legal
limitation. 18 7 Second, the Diet's explanation of the clause in the U.N. Par-
ticipation Law suggests that even as an ideal, Article 9 goes no further than
the current minimal standard in international law. Under the Diet's inter-
pretation, Article 9 is only a superficial concept that commits Japan to
nothing more than what is legally imposed on all members of the United
Nations. Together, these two changes mean that constitutional checks on
defense policy no longer exist. Broadly, the Guidelines, if passed, may not
appear to be the product of constitutional checks and balances, but rather
a reflection of the power of the LDP.
The only apparent check on Japanese defense policy is public opinion.
Public opinion, though, has changed steadily since 1950. Now, ninety per-
cent of the population supports the maintenance of the SDF.188 In the
future, public consensus could allow for complete constitutional transfor-
mation of Article 9 from the intentions of its drafters.
B. Japan as the Model of the Pacifist State
There is a larger implication to these changes in Article 9. While shifts in
public opinion and judicial deference reflect the pragmatic need to "adjust"
Article 9, it undermines and possibly destroys Japan's claim to being a con-
stitutionally-mandated pacifist state. A key principle of the Preamble of
the Constitution demonstrates that much of the Japanese national con-
science surrounds this notion of pacifism: "We, the Japanese people,
desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals con-
trolling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our
security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving
peoples of the world." 18 9 This principle of pacifism is the most distinctive
feature of the Japanese Constitution and is clearly expressed in Article
9.190
Practically speaking, Japanese foreign policy can best be explained by
self-interest rather than an ideological commitment to peace. The constitu-
tional prohibition in Article 9 prevented Japan from taking on greater
responsibility for its defense during the Cold War and served as a justifica-
185. Implementing the Guidelines to its fullest may also be premature for the general
public. The Japanese peoples' reaction to the death of police officers in Cambodia
strongly indicates that Japan is unprepared for the downside of being a global leader.
See Schlesinger & Kanahayashi, supra note 162, at 10.
186. See Pyle, supra note 73, at 105.
187. See, e.g., Cohen Press Briefing, supra note 65.
188. See Auer, supra note 17, at 83.
189. KENPO, preamble.
190. See NODA, supra note 96, at 194, 195-96.
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tion in avoiding pressure from the United States for a greater military
role. 191 This is not to say that the Japanese government was insincere in
these constitutional sentiments, but rather that the constitutional limita-
tion became a means to other goals such as economic development.
192
However, the examples of the Vietnam War, the Gulf War and Cambodia
demonstrate that the Japanese public still believes that pacifism is an
important part of Japan's national identity and cannot be easily
discarded.193
The Japanese government, though, has been acting as a rational, self-
interested state rather than a pacifist state.194 Arguably, the Guidelines
represent a new reflection of self-interest in response to the post-Cold War
system. In terms of a balance of power in the region, Japan may be better
able to achieve peace by maintaining a reasonably strong military than by
prohibiting all types of war potential on its territory. 195 In this light, the
Guidelines may be the best way to balance the ideal of pacifism against
Chinese interests and regional instability.
The Guidelines, however, do more than continue the trend away from
pacifism. The development of the SDF and the establishment of the secur-
ity arrangement with the United States can be justified as necessary for
territorial self-defense. 196 The Supreme Court's decision in Sunakawa clar-
ifies that both the SDF and the U.S.-Japan arrangement are at least de facto
legal.197 When one considers this precedent and practice in light of the
inherent ambiguity in the language of Article 9,198 some less-than-absolute
notion of pacifism can coexist with Japan's past efforts to provide for its
defense.
In contrast, the Guidelines, under the guise of self-defense, call for a
broader, regional role for the SDF which may also include preemptive
191. See Pyle, supra note 73, at 104-05. Pyle explains that theJapanese desire to nego-
tiate in terms of "comprehensive security" was a means to deflect emphasis from mili-
tary concerns. See id.
192. See id. One commentator suggests that another explanation for the shift from
pacifism is the growth of executive power in Japan since World War I. See generally
Kendrick Royer, The Demise of the World's First Pacifist Constitution: Japanese Constitu-
tional Interpretation and the Growth of Executive Power to Make War, 26 VAND. J. TRA'qs-
NAT'L L. 748 (1993).
193. See Part V.B.
194. Kenneth Waltz explains that a state will necessarily act in its own self-interest in
light of the anarchic conditions of the international system. No controls on the use of
force exist at the international level, so states must depend on themselves to protect their
national interest. See KENNETH WALTz, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR 238 (1954). But see
PETERJ. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NoRMs AND NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICE AND MILITARY IN
PosT-WAR JAPAN 129 (1996) (arguing that the realist focus on "rational, unified states
that compete in an anarchic system through balancing.., disregards the effects of insti-
tutionalized norms.").
195. Waltz argues that a state may desire peace, but the balance of power system
requires that no state become too strong or too weak relative to the other states in the
region or system. See id. at 222.
196. See supra notes 25, 39-42 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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action. 199 Further, the Guidelines permit the Japanese to engage in mili-
tary conduct abroad in support of a U.S. war.20 0 This type of conduct is
much harder to reconcile with the language of Article 9. Rather than mere
constitutional interpretation, the conduct permitted under the Guidelines
can potentially transform Article 9 into an entirely new norm - perhaps
outlawing only wars of aggression. 2 0 1 Pacifism may become a superficial
legal restraint, and the original normative force would be lost.
The Japanese experience demonstrates the problem with one state
adopting a pacifist legal culture. Pragmatic concerns and political self-
interest are easier policies to pursue than pacifism. One criticism is that
pacifism fails if the rest of the international system does not also follow it.
The Guidelines demonstrate Japanese feelings of insecurity - both of a
direct attack on Japan and a regional conflict - that pacifism cannot pro-
vide assurance of protection. 20 2
Those who sought the elimination of war through pacifism have
offered two types of proposals. One group of intellectuals who argued that
the anarchic system is to blame for war sought to create a world govern-
ment that monopolizes the use of force. The other group of scholars
sought to reform human morality at the individual level.20 3 Neither group
advocated that individual states should attempt to establish pacifism uni-
laterally by imposing it upon themselves. The Japanese model of pacifism
failed because, although well-meaning, it did not eradicate and account for
Japanese insecurity. 20 4 Under the constitutional limitation of Article 9,
Japan had been unable to protect its own interests, including achieving
peace.20 5
199. See supra notes 77-79, 81 and accompanying text. While the Guidelines do not
expressly permit preemptive military action, the linkage of Japanese self-defense to situ-
ations abroad may serve as a justification for such conduct. See Guidelines, supra note
1, at 1627, 1630-31.
200. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1632-33; supra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text.
201. But see TOWARD A DIFFERENCE: RESTRUCTURING U.S.-JuAN SECURITY RELATIONS
196-98 (Mike Mochizuki ed., 1997) (arguing thatJapan should interpret its constitution
to allow it to engage in collective self-defense).
202. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1624.
203. See SEYOM BROWN, THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF WAR 139-40 (2d ed. 1994).
204. But see Lawrence W. Beer, Peace in Theory and Practice under Article 9 of Japan's
Constitution, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 815 (1998). Beer argues that:
Japan now provides an anti-militarist example of what is not only desirable but
now possible and advisable for many nation states. Japan's record shows that
peace, security and great power status need not depend heavily on military
power, and that war or quick belligerent responses to foreign provocations in
violation of international law is not a common sense necessity for national
security.
Id. at 815-16. Beer admits that the Cold War and the bilateral security arrangement
enabled Japan to pursue a policy of what he calls quasi-pacifism. See id. at 815-16. Beer
does not address how the changes in the bilateral relationship instituted in the Guide-
lines affect Japan's status as a pacifist state and its usefulness as a model for the world.
205. This is not to say that Japan's experience with Article 9 has been without suc-
cess. Lawrence Beer argues that Article 9 is responsible for 50 years of peace, limited
military build-up and maintaining civilian control of the government. See Lawrence W.
Beer, The Influence of American Constitutionalism in Asia, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL-
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Given the problems inherent in Article 9, adopting the Guidelines
would arguably be constitutionally inconsequential. This conclusion
could be bolstered by the origins of Article 9 and the Constitution itself.
As the Constitutional Commission explained, "[t]he present Constitution
was not enacted on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Japanese
people," but instead was "an expression of Allied occupation policy for
Japan. '20 6 Under this interpretation, Japan's process of constitutional
transformation of Article 9 and the adoption of the Guidelines may be
excusable, if not justified.
There are three main problems with this argument. First, it ignores the
importance of pacifism in Japanese society. Whatever may have been the
Japanese view of pacifism at the end of World War II, the Japanese people
today embrace pacifism as part of their national identity. This is primarily
a result of decades of education through the mass media and in the school
system. 20 7 Another key reason is the collective memory of the devastation
from the war.20 8 While there is a vocal group that views the war and Arti-
cle 9 as a continuing humiliation, the majority in Japan is strongly
attached to pacifism. 20 9 The effect of the attachment is not just respect for
Article 9, but an abhorrence of war altogether.210 Thus, despite the
problems of living with Article 9, the Japanese people are generally com-
mitted to its preservation.
The second criticism is that the argument ignores Japan's perception
of the Constitution. Although the Commission on the Constitution sug-
gested that Japan enact a new Constitution that reflects the will of the peo-
ple,211 Japan's Constitution, as Lawrence Beer explained, "has fit the
country's politico-legal culture, natural needs, and popular desires,
and ... many Japanese have been vigilant in its defense."212 Despite U.S.
influences, the Japanese people strongly support the central role of the
Constitution 213 and have embraced the document as their own.
Finally, given the Japanese support for their Constitution, respect for
Article 9 is important for the preservation of constitutionalism. Although
one scholar has argued that a great deal of Japanese law is exercised
extraconstitutionally, 214 Commentators agree that Japan recognizes the
ISM ABROAD: SELECTED ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE CONsTITUTIONAL HISTORY 132-33 (George
A. Billias ed., 1990).
206. Maki, supra note 30, at 378.
207. See Beer, supra note 204, at 828.
208. See John M. Maid, Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Human Rights, in JAPANESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LA v, supra note 17, at 4243.
209. See id.
210. See Beer, supra note 204, at 828.
211. See Maid, supra note 30, at 379. The Commission argued that the ideal Constitu-
tion "should be one which has been freely enacted by the Japanese people; is in accord
with the history, tradition, individuality, and national character of Japan as well as the
universal principle of fundamental human rights; and is realistic, effective, and in har-
mony with world trends." Id.
212. Beer, supra note 205, at 133.
213. See id.
214. See Dan Fenno Henderson, Comment, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (1990).
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value of law and constitutionalism. 215 Even the Commission on the Con-
stitution has recognized that a written constitution is intended to establish
written limits. If it is interpreted and applied too broadly, it may ultimately
be negated. 216 A clear U.S. legacy upon the Japanese political and legal
system is the "commitment to the principle of the supremacy of the law of
the [c]onstitution .... "217 The Constitution is designed to limit the powers
of the government. 218 In order to respect this role and supremacy of the
Constitution, Japan cannot ignore the language of Article 9.
C. Japan's Alternatives
As the Diet debates the implementing legislation of the Guidelines for pas-
sage, it is caught in a legal quagmire. The Guidelines offer greater security,
but their implementation will erode Japan's constitutionally-mandated pac-
ifism. Japan has three possible alternative ways to deal with these compet-
ing interests: it may (1) amend Article 9 to permit the expansion of SDF
powers under the Guidelines; (2) pass the Guidelines legislation without
any other explicit change in law; or (3) reject the Guidelines as unconstitu-
tional in whole or in part.
1. An Amendment to Article 9
First, Article 9 could be amended to explicitly allow self-defense and set
limits on its use.219 At the very least, paragraph 2 should be amended to
read "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained except for forces solely for the purpose of self-defense."'2 20 This
amendment would explicitly legalize the existence of the SDF and justify
judicial deference to the executive as to what is necessary for self-defense.
The language would create the legal space for the Guidelines to be constitu-
tional without relying on the theory of constitutional transformation.
215. See generally BEER & IToH, supra note 16, at 7-9.
216. See Maki, supra note 30, at 380. The Commission believed that the Constitution
warranted revision precisely because Japan had gone beyond its limits. See id. Cf. Larry
Alexander, Introduction, in CONs-r-UToNALiSM 5 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (comment-
ing that "[i]f on the other hand, we make our acceptance of the Constitution's authority
dependent on its squaring perfectly with our present political and moral views, the Con-
stitution's stability - its raison d'etre - will be undermined.").
217. Lawrence W. Beer, Introduction to CONSrU-noNALIsM IN AsIA, supra note 97, at
19.
218. See, e.g., S.E. FINER ET AL., COMPARING CoNS TnTmoNs 2 (1995) (commenting that
"constitutions are otiose: If the powerholders exercise self-restraint, the written constitu-
tion is unnecessary, and if they do not then it is useless.").
219. Royer argues that the time is right for an amendment to Article 9 due to the
influence of the bureaucracy, conservative parties and industry combined with interna-
tional pressure for an expanded Japanese role in the region. See Royer, supra note 191,
at 801.
220. The conservative newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun proposed a more drastic amend-
ment in 1994. It argued for the repeal of Article 9 and expressly allowed for "an organi-
zation for self-defense to secure Japan's peace and independence and to maintain its
safety." The newspaper also renamed the SDF as Japan's Armed Forces. See O'BIEN,
supra note 144, at 177.
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At first glance, an amendment to Article 9 seems to be the optimal
solution. The Guidelines would be constitutional. An amendment would
resolve some of the conflict between pacifism and practical security con-
cerns. While this conflict may be resolved, the solution signals the death
of Japanese pacifism. An amendment to Article 9 would be official recogni-
tion that Japan cannot trust in the "justice and faith of the peace-loving
peoples of the world" to protect its own security. Self-interest rather than
pacifism would be the guiding force behind Japanese security policy.
The chance of passing such an amendment through the legislature is
also extremely unlikely. Japan has never amended the Constitution,221
and the process of amendment is fairly difficult. First, Article 96 of the
Constitution requires an amendment to be passed by two-thirds of each
house of the Diet.2 22 Then, the proposed amendment must be approved by
a majority of the Japanese people in a referendum. 223 There is also no
precedent for constitutional amendment in Japan. 2 24
There are also psychological obstacles to passage of an amendment to
Article 9. The Japanese people view Article 9 as the most distinctive fea-
ture of the Constitution.225 More importantly, the principle of pacifism
espoused in Article 9 is central to the Japanese national identity.226 This
alternative then would come at very high political and social costs to Japan.
Finally, even if these obstacles did not exist, some parts of the Consti-
tution are arguably immune from amendment. The language of Articles 11
and 98 of the Constitution explain that fundamental human rights are invi-
olate, thus implying that they are unchangeable.227 There is serious doubt
whether fundamental principles of the Japanese Constitution including
pacifism can be amended.228 Thus, even if there was a desire to amend
Article 9, it may not be permissible under the Constitution.
2. Implementation of the Guidelines Without any Change of Law
The second alternative is to implement the Guidelines without any change
in law, essentially "business as usual" for the Japanese Cabinet and Diet.
The government simply assumes that the Guidelines are constitutional as a
matter of policy and can be fully implemented. The advantage of this
221. See Kasuya, supra note 11, at 1.
222. KENPO, art. 96.
223. Id.
224. See Sandra Madsen, Note, The Japanese Constitution and Sef-Defense Forces: Pros-
pects for a New Japanese Military Role, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTrEMP. PROBS. 349, 367
(1993).
225. See NODA, supra note 96, at 194, 195-96.
226. See, e.g., Japan's Debate on Force, supra note 162, at A18; Japanese Protest Troops
for Gulf, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at A 10.
227. See MichaelJ. Perry, What is "the Constitution," in CONSTUTIONAIISM, supra note
216, at 136 n.14.
228. See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the Interna-
tional Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 603 (1998). However, given the def-
erence of the Supreme Court, see supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text, it is
unclear what checks actually exist to protect fundamental principles of the Constitution
from amendment.
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choice is that it is the easiest in the short term. It avoids a public debate on
defense policy and forecloses any legal challenges in the Japanese courts.
The Japanese Cabinet can expand the role of the SDF while the courts
remain unwilling to challenge an ongoing military action when
implemented.
This alternative is problematic since it erodes the meaning of Article 9
into, at best, an intangible ideal and at worst, outright hypocrisy. If the
Diet and Cabinet reevaluate the Guidelines twenty years into the future in
the face of some changing security dynamic and further withdrawal by the
United States, Article 9 may lose all of its original normative force. Dis-
turbingly, under this policy of ignorance, the Guidelines are not be the
product of real constitutional democracy but rather the pragmatic needs of
the governing elite who lack the political consensus to amend the
Constitution.
This is not to suggest thatJapan is likely to become a military power in
the future. It is a mistake to believe that Japan may eventually bring its
political and military interests to bear on the world like a new United
States. Japan is still a trading state rather than a burgeoning political and
military superpower.2 29 The problem with tacit acceptance of the Guide-
lines is that it undermines a constitutional form of government. Under its
original intent, Article 9 restrains Japanese militarism and reassures
Japan's neighbors.2 30 Adopting the Guidelines without any change of laws
undermines this constitutional scheme and leaves the Cabinet relatively
unfettered in defense policy.
3. Rejection of the Guidelines in Whole or in Part
The third alternative is to reject the Guidelines in whole or in part as
unconstitutional. While the Guidelines are a pragmatic answer to growing
regional instability and a decreasing U.S. presence, they only hurt the nor-
mative force of Article 9. By rejecting them, Japan sends a message that
Article 9 still imposes some real restrictions. 23 1
However, it may not be necessary for Japan to reject the Guidelines
completely to preserve Article 9. It would be unrealistic to believe that the
original absolutist intent of Article 9 can ever be reestablished, since the
SDF have been in existence for over forty years. The objective instead is to
set limits on Article 9 that would serve as constraints on the Cabinet.
One possible compromise between pacifism and security concerns is
to eliminate the regional security provisions while recognizing the U.S.-
Japan alliance and Japan's right to self-defense. This would entail the
229. See RICHARD ROSENCRANCE, THE RISE OF THE TRADING STATE: COMMERCE AND CON-
QUEST IN THE MODERN WORLD Xi (1986). Rosencrance argues thatJapan represents a new
model in the international system called a "trading state." The trading state does not use
political or military power to achieve its ends, but relies instead on economic coopera-
tion. See id.
230. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
231. The rejection of the Gulf War bill illustrates that the Diet and the Cabinet have
been willing to sacrifice short-term political goals for Article 9 at least in response to
negative public sentiment. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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implementation of the Guidelines without the section on Cooperation in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. 23 2 The Japanese public seems
unprepared for Japan to play such a regional role, so this measure has the
benefit of being consistent with public sentiment, yet still allows for self-
defense. Japan may be only a quasi-pacifist state, but it maintains a sem-
blance of the original constitutional framework.
Overall, this position is the most tenable if Japan seeks to preserve
Article 9. However, this alternative may not be pragmatic. It serves to
undermine the balance achieved by the Guidelines and damages the U.S.-
Japan security relationship. 233 The pragmatic approach, though, is also
problematic for several reasons. First, it assumes that the constitutional
constraint of Article 9 could and should be balanced by other values. Until
Japan has a national debate on what is appropriate military policy, this
assumption seems premature. Second, rejection of the Guidelines is not a
rejection of the security relationship between the United States and Japan.
It would result in only a return to the status quo and does not preclude
future discussion. By rejecting part of the Guidelines under Article 9, any
future negotiations would occur within established constitutional limits.
Further, the ultimate goal of the Guidelines is peace.234 While the
objective of the Guidelines is regional stability, this is not the intention
behind Article 9's pacifism. Adoption of the Guidelines on this justifica-
tion denigrates Article 9 to being only an aspiration. Not only is this not
the original intent,235 it is not the view of the Japanesd people today.236
Rejection of the Guidelines, even only a portion, will result in some
political costs both at home and with the United States. However, these
costs seem bearable compared to the process of constitutional amendment.
Furthermore, these are short-term costs. In the long run, rejection of the
Guidelines will serve as a symbol of constitutional limits both to future
Cabinets and the United States.
Conclusion
The Guidelines may represent the future of Japanese security, but they are
fundamentally inconsistent with a notion of a pacifist state. While the Jap-
anese people truly believe in their pacifist identity, the reality is that Japan
232. Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1630-31.
233. See Chris Ajemian, Comment, The 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Under the
Japanese Constitution and Their Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 PAc. RIM L. &
PoL'Y, 323 (1998) (arguing that the Guidelines are constitutional and are necessary for
the establishment of Japan as a self-sufficient state and regional power); see also Wein-
berger, supra note 4, at 37. For the view that the Guidelines do not go far enough, see
Carpenter, supra note 5, at 17A (arguing that the Guidelines do not establishJapan as a
self-sufficient state and regional power).
234. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at 1625. See also joint Declaration, supra note 1, at
1003; Joint Statement of the SCC, supra note 1, at 1623.
235. See supra note 101 and ac&ompanying text.
236. See notes 205-08 and accompanying text. While 90% of the Japanese people
support the existence of the SDF, see Auer, supra note 17, at 83, theJapanese people have
remained wary of any external use of those forces. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 22, at 388.
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does not exist in a vacuum. Japan has a difficult choice to make when it
decides whether to pass legislation implementing the new Guidelines. It
can amend the Constitution, do nothing at all or reject the Guidelines as
they are currently written. The optimal choice is to reject the Guidelines in
favor of something less expansive. Sadly, the judiciary is unlikely to make
this choice since it has deferred all defense issues to the executive branch.
Thus, it is left to the Diet or perhaps the new Obuchi Cabinet to either
reject the agreement or instill some new meaning into Article 9. These
choices may modify the original absolutist intent of Article 9, but they
ensure that pacifism is not just an ideal, but a constitutional requirement.
